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Abensur: What's So Civil About Civil Commitment?: Balancing the State's In

NOTE
WHAT'S SO CIVIL ABOUT CIVIL COMMITMENT?:
BALANCING THE STATE'S INTEREST IN
TREATING SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE WITH THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
INTERESTS
I. INTRODUCTION

In many ways, Natalie Ciappa's senior year at a Long Island high
school was like that of every other senior. She spent time with her
brothers and with friends. She enjoyed watching horror movies with her
family. She was a cheerleader and a gifted singer in an all-county
chorus. She applied to colleges and intended to study criminal
2
psychology at a state university.' Natalie was also addicted to heroin.
Natalie's parents were concerned that she was using drugs, but they
did not know the extent of their daughter's addiction. While their
concern was enough to prompt a discussion about drug treatment,
Natalie did not want to get treatment and her parents did not force her.3
Instead, her parents attempted to control Natalie's drug use by enforcing
rules at home. They searched her room for drugs, tracked her cell phone
calls, and monitored her internet activity.4 Despite her parents' attempts
to keep Natalie away from drugs, on May 25, 2008, her parents
discovered Natalie in her bedroom, unconscious and not breathing. 5
Rescue workers revived Natalie and her parents were told at the hospital
that she had overdosed on heroin.6
1. Jennifer Maloney, Parents' Search for Daughter, 18, Ends in Their Worst Nightmare,
NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), June 23, 2008, at A3.

2. See Doreen Ciappa, A Mother's Pain, NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), July 10, 2008, at
A3.

3.
4.
10, 2008,
5.
6.

Id.
Joye Brown, Her Parents' Love Couldn't Save Her, NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), July
at A2.
Id.
id.
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Although Natalie's parents now understood the severity of her
addiction to drugs and wanted to admit her into a drug treatment
facility, 7 New York law did not permit them to do so without Natalie's
consent.8 Natalie had turned eighteen only ten weeks before her nearfatal overdose, and therefore was legally an adult.9 "When she
overdosed ... we thought, thank God, now they'll put her in [drug

treatment] ... but we discovered that, no, she's 18. And even if a kid
dies and has to be resuscitated and brought into a hospital, the parents
still can't put them into rehab."' Although her parents were responsible
for her medical bills, once she turned eighteen they could no longer
make medical decisions for Natalie. 1
On June 21, 2008, Natalie went to a party and did not return
home.12 After a frantic search, her parents found her "lying face down on
a couch in her friend's rec room .... 13 Her parents immediately
performed CPR, but the attempt to resuscitate their daughter was
unsuccessful.1 4 Only three weeks after Natalie's parents learned of her
addiction and that they had no authority
to get her drug treatment,
5
Natalie died of a heroin overdose.1
Unfortunately, Natalie's story is not unique. Drug abuse is a
widespread problem in the United States 16 and non-medical use of
narcotics by young adults has increased in recent years. 17 Heroin has

7. See Ciappa, supra note 2.
8. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 22.07(b) (McKinney 2006) (requiring that treatment for
substance dependence be voluntary).
9. Brown, supra note 4.
10. Ciappa, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Maloney, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. Brown, supranote 4.
15. Ciappa, supra note 2.
16. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG

USE AND HEALTH: NATIONAL FINDINGS 16 (2008) (reporting that an estimated 19.9 million
Americans aged twelve or older had used an illicit drug during the month proceeding the survey).
17. Id. at 21 (finding that from 2002 to 2007, non-medical use of prescription pain relievers
increased by 12%, rising to 4.6% among adults ages eighteen to twenty-five). According to the
account of a detective sergeant who heads the Neighborhood Enforcement Special Operation Team
in Fourth Precinct of Suffolk County, New York, heroin use by teenagers and young adults has
increased dramatically in the last two years. Stephanie Altherr, Smithtown Chooses to Fight,
NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), Oct. 4, 2009, at A2 (reporting an increase in arrests for heroin
possession from 15 in 2004 to 117 in 2008 in Smithtown, N.Y.).
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become the "trendy drug of choice among teenagers"' 8 and, particularly
in the Northeast, its use among young adults in suburban and rural
communities is rising.' 9 Reports of heroin-related deaths of young adults
nationwide 20 support Natalie's parents' contention that the law should
give parents more power to get their adult children necessary drug
treatment. 21
Drug and alcohol dependence are serious problems that have
consequences on the quality of life of the addicted person, as well as on
society. 22 Use of illicit drugs and alcohol is common in American
society. For some people, however, use becomes abuse, and then
dependence. It is widely accepted that it is imperative for a substancedependent individual to receive treatment in order to achieve long-term
sobriety. 23 Unfortunately, many of the people needing treatment do not
18. Heroin Has New
Victims,
WASH.
TIMES
(D.C.),
Aug.
5,
2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/05/heroin-has-new-victims/; see also Altherr,
supra note 17 ("[Olpiates-particularly prescription narcotics such as oxycodone-[are] the party
drugs of choice for the 16- to 24-year-old crowd.").
19. See Richard G. Jones, Heroin's Hold on the Young, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, at NJI
(reporting that New York and New Jersey have high rates of heroin use among teenagers).
20. See, e.g., Altherr, supra note 17 (reporting that since January 2006, thirty people have
died in Suffolk County, New York after overdosing on heroin or other opiates); Rex Hall Jr. & Julie
Mack, Dying for Drugs: Toll from Opiate Overdose Rises Among Young People in Kalamazoo
Area, KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, Aug. 10, 2008, at 10 (reporting sixteen opiate-related deaths of teens
and young adults in Kalamazoo County, Michigan since 2003); Jones, supra note 19 (reporting that
three young adults died of heroin overdoses within one year in a small Connecticut town); Lourdes
Medrano, Teen Heroin Use Rising on NW Side, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, July 20, 2008, at Al
(contending that police officers in Tucson, Arizona have noticed a rise in heroin addiction among
teens and young adults, and reporting three local teen deaths by heroin overdose since 2007); Su-jin
Yim, Oregon Sees a Surge in Overdoses and Use by Teens, a Fact a Milwaukie Mom Knows All
Too Well, OREGONIAN, June 22, 2008, at Al (reporting a 29% increase in deaths from heroin
overdose in the last year in Oregon, for a total of 115 people in 2007).
21. Brown, supra note 4. At a town meeting concerning the rising problems of heroin use
among young adults in Smithtown, New York, one mother said that her son is living on the streets
and is addicted to heroin. She told the silent room that for the last four years she has been fighting to
save her son from his addiction. Altherr, supra note 17.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. The international community generally recognizes the necessity of treatment for substance
dependence. "While drug-dependent persons may be imprisoned because of unlawful activity
associated with their drug dependence, it remains urgent that dependent and harmful use of
substances be considered as a health problem and treated accordingly." World Health Org. [WHO],
Substance Abuse Dep't Social Change & Mental Health, Drug and Alcohol Dependence Policies,
Legislation and Programmes for Treatment and Rehabilitation, at 63, WHO/HSC/SAB/99.10
(1999) (prepared by Lane Porter et al.), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.inthq/
1999/WHOHSCSAB_99.10_chapl-7.pdf; see also Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 1996
S.C., ch. 19, § 10(1) (Can.) (declaring that the purpose of sentencing for drug offenses "is to
contribute to the respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society while
encouragingrehabilitation,and treatment in appropriate circumstances ....
")(emphasis added).
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receive it because they do not have the insight necessary to identify the
problem. 24 Frequently, they require another person-a parent, a doctor,
or a member of law enforcement-to recognize the problem.2 5
Requiring a person to seek treatment for a substance addiction is
not a new idea. The criminal justice system has been mandating
26
treatment for substance-abusing offenders for more than thirty years.
Treatment is often mistakenly thought to be effective only if the person
has hit "rock bottom, '' 27 a term used to indicate a readiness to change.
Contrary to this belief, legal coercion into treatment generally correlates
positively with treatment retention, 28 which is associated with long-term
sobriety. 29 Other non-legal extrinsic factors such as pressure from
families and employers, homelessness, and financial problems 30 are also
considered valuable to the treatment process. 3' Treatment following a
civil commitment for substance addiction relies on similar extrinsic
factors, and therefore it can be inferred that civil commitment will also
result in an increased likelihood of long-term sobriety.32

24. See OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE NSDUH REPORT: REASONS FOR NOT
RECEIVING SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 2 (2003), available at http://oas.samhsa.gov/2k3/
SAnoTX/SAnoTX.pdf.

25. See Douglas B. Marlowe et al., Assessment of Coercive and Noncoercive Pressures to
Enter Drug Abuse Treatment, 42 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 77, 78 (1996) (discussing the
role of legal and social networks in identifying the need for and facilitating the entry into drug
dependence treatment).
26. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DRUG
POLICY INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE FACT SHEET: DRUG TREATMENT IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2001), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/
pdf/94406.pdf.
27. See William R. Miller, IncreasingMotivationfor Change, in HANDBOOK OF ALCOHOLISM
TREATMENT APPROACHES: EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES 89, 90-91 (Reid K. Hester & William R.
Miller eds., 2d ed. 1989).

28. David Farabee et al., The Effectiveness of Coerced Treatment for Drug-Abusing
Offenders, 62 FED. PROBATION 3, 5, 7 (1998); Matthew L. Hiller et al., Motivation as a Predictorof
Therapeutic Engagement in Mandated Residential Substance Abuse Treatment, 29 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 56, 70 (2002).

29. See Douglas Young, Impacts of Perceived Legal Pressure on Retention in Drug
Treatment,29 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 27, 28 (2002).
30. See Marlowe et al., supra note 25, at 78, 81.
31. Matthew L. Hiller et al., Problem Severity andMotivationfor Treatment in Incarcerated
Substance Abusers, 44 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 28, 35 (2009).

32. See Anna C. Burke & Thomas K. Gregoire, Substance Abuse Treatment Outcomes for
Coerced and Noncoerced Clients, 32 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 7, 11 (2007) (finding that coerced
clients were almost three times more likely than non-coerced clients to report abstention from
alcohol and drugs six months following discharge from treatment); see also Dominique BourquinTi~che et al., Involuntary Treatment of Alcohol-Dependent Patients: A Study of 17 Consecutive
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This Note posits that parents and other caregivers should be able to
initiate state action committing individuals over the age of eighteen to
short-term treatment where (1) the individual meets the diagnostic
criteria for drug or alcohol dependence; and (2) the state finds sufficient
evidence that there is a substantial risk of harm because of the drug or
alcohol dependence. In order to protect the liberties of the individual,
however, this Note suggests more stringent procedural and substantive
laws pertaining to civil commitment for substance dependence. Part II
provides an overview of the pervasiveness of substance abuse in the
United States. This Part then discusses the ramifications of substance
abuse on society and specifically on the criminal justice system. Part III
discusses the effectiveness of legally coerced treatment. It begins with
an analysis of motivation for treatment and the role of coerced, extrinsic
factors. This Part goes on to discuss the use of legal coercion in the
criminal justice system, focusing specifically on drug treatment courts.
This Part ends with a look at coercive treatment in the civil system. Part
IV offers a detailed description of the legal constraints to civil
commitment for substance dependence, addressing the constitutional
requirements of procedural and substantive due process. Finally, Part V
proposes a model rule for civil commitment of people suffering from
substance dependence, where there is a substantial risk of harm because
of this dependence. This Part recommends that all states adopt the
proposed statute, but that that the rise in heroin use among young adults
in New York necessitates that the statute be adopted by New York.
II. PERVASIVENESS OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Impact of Substance Abuse on Society
The American Psychiatric Association ("APA") defines substance
dependence 33 as "[a] maladaptive pattern of substance use, leading to
clinically significant impairment or distress, as manifested by three (or
more) of the following, occurring at any time in the same 12-month
period": 34 tolerance; withdrawal; higher quantity of substance or

Cases of Civil Commitment, 7 EUR. ADDICTION RES. 48, 51 (2001) (discussing increased abstinence
from alcohol following civil commitment).
33. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 181 (4th ed. 1994). Alcohol dependence has the same criteria as other drugs. See id. at
195.
34. Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
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frequency of use than intended; desire or unsuccessful attempts to reduce
use; much time given to obtaining, using, or recovering from the
substance; reduced social, occupational, or recreational activities due to
use; and use continued despite persistent physical or psychological
problems caused or exacerbated by use.35 Substance abuse36 is a
pervasive, costly

37

problem

in American

society that transcends

geographic and racial lines.3 8 Although substance abuse affects all
populations, the highest rates of substance abuse and dependence occur
in young adults, ages eighteen to twenty-five. 39 Whereas only 1% of
35. Id. Compare the criteria for substance dependence with the criteria for substance abuse,
which requires
[a] maladaptive pattern of substance use leading to clinically significant impairment or
distress, as manifested by one (or more) of the following, occurring within a 12-month
period: (1) recurrent substance use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role obligations
at work, school, or home ... (2) recurrent substance use in situations in which it is
physically hazardous ... (3) recurrent substance-related legal problems ... (4) continued
substance use despite having persistent or recurrent social or interpersonal problems
caused or exacerbated by the effects of the substance ....
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 33, at 182-83 (emphasis added). During his term as senator,
Vice President Joseph Biden introduced a bill which defined addiction and recognized that the
"term 'abuse' used in connection with diseases of addiction has the adverse effect of increasing
social stigma and personal shame, both of which are so often barriers to an individual's decision to
seek treatment." Recognizing Addiction as a Disease Act of 2007, S. 1011, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007).
Recent reform in New York drug policies has also recognized that addiction is a disease for which
treatment is a necessity. "Today, drug use and addiction will no longer be considered solely a
criminal matter in this state but a public health matter as well. We know that drug addiction is a
disease for which there are better, more humane, more effective and less costly alternatives than
prison." Assemblyman Sheldon Silver, Remarks at the Rockefeller Drug Law Press Conference
(Apr. 24, 2009), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/20090424a/ (discussing reform to the
Rockefeller Drug Laws).
36. National and state surveys on substance use often combine statistics on substance abuse
and substance dependence, although the difference is acknowledged. See, e.g., OFFICE OF APPLIED
STUDIES, supra note 16, at 71-76; ARTHUR HUGHES ET AL., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DHHS PUBL'N No. SMA 08-4311, STATE ESTIMATES OF SUBSTANCE USE FROM 2005-2006
NATIONAL
SURVEYS ON DRUG
USE AND HEALTH
57-59 (2008), available at

http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k6state/2k6state.pdf.
37. "[I]n 2002, the economic cost of drug abuse to the United States was $180.9 billion."
NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROD. No. 2006-Q0317-001, NATIONAL
DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2006, at 36 (2006).

38. In 2007, rates of substance dependence or abuse varied slightly by region of the country,
with the Midwest the highest (10.0%) and the Northeast the lowest (8.1%). Prevalence differed
slightly by race, with 9.4% of whites, 8.5% of blacks, and 8.3% of Hispanics suffering from
substance abuse or dependence. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, supra note 16, at 75-76.
39. HUGHES ET AL., supra note 36, at 57-58. One explanation for the lower rates of drug use
amongst older individuals is the "aging out" phenomenon, which theorizes that older people may be
more receptive to treatment or may grow tired of the addicted lifestyle. See Michael Rempel &
Christine Depies Destefano, Predictorsof Engagement in Court-Mandated Treatment: Findings at
the Brooklyn Treatment Court, 1996-2000, in DRUG COURTS IN OPERATION: CURRENT RESEARCH

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss4/9
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people over the age of twenty-five are drug dependent, this figure rises
to almost 6% of people ages eighteen to twenty-five.40 Similarly, while
less than 3% of people over the age of twenty-five are dependent on
alcohol, more than 7% of people between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-five suffer from alcohol dependence. 4 1 Also, significantly, males
are more than two times as likely to abuse substances than females.
Substance abuse is also associated with lower levels of education,43
45
44
higher levels of unemployment, and increased risk of homelessness.
Additionally, children of drug abusers suffer a higher risk of abuse or

neglect because the need to obtain and use drugs may become a higher
priority than the children's health and welfare.4 6
Because one of the effects of substance abuse is ill health and
disease,4 7 visits to the emergency department are common. In 2006,
48
there were an estimated 958,164 visits to the emergency department

because of illicit drug use.4 9 One-third (303,715) of these visits were

91 (James J. Hennessy & Nathaniel J. Pallone eds., 2001); Jerome J. Platt et al., The Prospects and
Limitations of Compulsory Treatment for Drug Addiction, 18 J. DRUG ISSUES 505, 511-12 (1988).
But see Diana M. Hartel et al., Gender Differences in Illicit Substance Use Among Middle-Aged
Drug Users With or at Risk for HIV Infection, 43 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 525, 527 (2006)
(finding that 40% of people who had ever used cocaine or heroin continued use into middle-age).
40. HUGHES ET AL., supra note 36, at app. B, tbl.19.
41. Id. at app. B, tbl.17.
42. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, supra note 16, at 75 (finding 12.5% as compared to 5.7%,
respectively).
43. Id. at 76 (comparing 7.5% of college graduates with 9.8% of people who did not graduate
from high school abuse or are dependent on substances).
44. Id. (finding that 20.0% of unemployed adults, as compared with 10.1% of full-time
employed adults and 10.6% of part-time employed adults abuse or are dependant on substances); cf
NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 37, at 36 (contending that employers are negatively
affected financially by employees who abuse drugs because of increased absenteeism, lost
productivity, and increased use of medical benefits).
45. Jonathan B. Vangeest & Timothy P. Johnson, Substance Abuse and Homelessness: Direct
or Indirect Effects?, 12 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 455,459 (2002) (linking substance abuse indirectly
to homelessness).
46. NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 37, at 36.
47. Id.
48. An Act by Congress in 1986 entitled the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act ("EMTALA") prohibits emergency departments from refusing treatment to the uninsured and
underinsured. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2006). In 2001, 4.2 billion dollars in revenue was lost due to
emergency physicians providing EMTALA-related care. JOINT COMM'N RES., MANAGING PATIENT
FLOW: STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS FOR ADDRESSING HOSPITAL OVERCROWDING 24 (2004).
49. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DHHS PUBL'N No. SMA 08-4339, DRUG ABUSE
WARNING NETWORK, 2006: NATIONAL ESTIMATES OF DRUG-RELATED EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
VISITS 19 (2008).
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individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine.5 0 Although
drug abuse generally has negative effects on health, injection drug use
especially increases the health risks for the drug abuser. In 2000, there
were 30,000 new cases of hepatitis C in the United States; an estimated
60% were injection drug users.51 Injection drug users are also
particularly susceptible to contracting HIV/AIDS, and sadly the survival
rate for people with AIDS is lower when the disease is contracted by
injection drug use.52 Despite the grave risks associated with injection
drug use, a national survey conducted in 2004 indicated that more than
3.5 million people have injected illicit drugs in their lifetime; 14% were

between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.53
Despite the pervasiveness of substance abuse and dependence, the
treatment gap is significantly wide. The treatment gap represents the
number of people who need treatment for substance abuse or
dependence, but who do not receive it in a specialty facility such as an
inpatient or outpatient drug and alcohol rehabilitation facility, a hospital,
or a mental health center.54 In 2000, 4.7 million people needed treatment
55
for drug abuse or dependence, but only 16% (0.8 million) received it.
This treatment gap represented 1.7% of the total national population. By
2006, this number had increased to 2.5%.56 Close to 24 million people
needed treatment for a problem with drugs or alcohol in 2006; however,
only 11% 57 (2.5 million) received the necessary treatment. 58 Most people
50. Id.at 23.
51. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
VIRAL HEPATITIS AND INJECTION DRUG USERS 3 (2002), http://www.cdc.gov/idu/hepatitis/
viralhepdruguse.pdf. Although there are other methods of contraction, in the United States, the
transmission of hepatitis C most often occurs by injection drug users sharing needles. One-third of
injection drug users ages eighteen to thirty are infected with hepatitis C; this number rises to 70% to
90% of older injection drug users, indicating an increased risk of contraction associated with
continued use of injection drugs. See Hepatitis C FAQs for Health Professionals,
http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/HCV/HCVfaq.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2009); see, e.g., Stephen
Smith, Hepatitis C Rises Among Young People, BOSTON GLOBE, May 8, 2007, at Al (reporting a
correlation between the 300% increase in hepatitis C from 2001 to 2005 among young adults ages
fifteen to twenty-five and the state-wide epidemic of heroin use).
52. NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 37, at 36.
53. Id.
54. See HUGHES ET AL., supra note 36, at 59.
55. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DHHS PUBL'N No. SMA 02-3640, NATIONAL AND
STATE ESTIMATES OF THE DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT GAP: 2000 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY

ON DRUG ABUSE 4 (2002), available at http://oas.samhsa.gov/TXgap/TXgap.pdf.
56.

See HUGHES ET AL., supra note 36, at 59.

57.

Of admissions to publicly funded substance abuse treatment programs in 2006, 10.4%

were ages fifteen to nineteen, 14.4% were ages twenty to twenty-four, and 14.0% were ages twenty-
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who abuse or are dependent on substances do not perceive the need for
treatment.5 9 Therefore, despite the severity and pervasiveness of
substance abuse and dependence, the majority of people who need
treatment do not receive it.60 Legally mandated treatment could narrow
the treatment gap by providing treatment to individuals who meet the
diagnostic criteria of substance dependence, regardless of the
individual's recognition of a problem.
B. The Impact of Substance Abuse on the CriminalJustice System
It is well-established in addiction research that there is an
association between substance abuse and crime. 6 1 Rates of illicit drug
use are significantly greater in criminal justice populations as compared
with the general population. 62 Although there may not be a causal
relationship because of other influencing factors, substance abuse is
considered a predisposing factor to criminal, especially violent,
behavior. 63 Alcohol or drug use often occurs prior to or during the
One study also indicates that individuals
commission of violent crimes. 64aloidctstainiiul
who abuse multiple drugs are twice as likely to commit offenses and to
commit twice the number of offenses as compared to abusers of a single
drug.65
The necessity of addressing substance abuse within the criminal
justice system has become apparent. In 2002, national costs of the

five to twenty-nine. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NIDA

INFOFACTS:

TREATMENT

STATISTICS

1-2

(2008),

http://www.nida.nih.gov/PDF/

lnfoFacts/TreatmentStats08.pdf.
58. Id.at 1.
59. In 2002, only 6% of people with untreated drug abuse or dependence and less than 5% of
those with untreated alcohol abuse or dependence reported a perceived unmet treatment need.
OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, supra note 24, at 2.
60. Id. (reporting that in 2002 only 18% of people needing treatment for an illicit drug
problem and 8% of people needing treatment for an alcohol problem received treatment).
61. Sharon M. Boles & Karen Miotto, Substance Abuse and Violence: A Review of the
Literature, 8 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 155, 169 (2003); Alfred S. Friedman, Substance
Use/Abuse as a Predictor to Illegal and Violent Behavior: A Review of the Relevant Literature, 3
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 339, 350-51 (1998); Eric L. Sevigny & Phyllis D. Coontz,
Patterns of Substance Involvement and Criminal Behavior: A Gender-Based Cluster Analysis of
PennsylvaniaArrestees, 52 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 435, 435 (2008).
62. Arthur J. Lurigio, Drug Treatment Availability and Effectiveness: Studies of the General
and CriminalJustice Populations,27 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 495,496 (2000).
63. Friedman, supra note 61, at 350.
64. Boles & Miotto, supra note 61, at 169.
65. Trevor Bennett & Katy Holloway, The Association Between Multiple Drug Misuse and
Crime, 49 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 63, 74 (2005).
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criminal justice system attributed to drug abuse were almost 30 billion
dollars.66 Only ten years earlier, the cost to the criminal justice system
was half that amount. 67 In 2000, drug-related offenders accounted for
21% of the state and 57% of the federal prison population.68
Also significant is the correlation between drug use and the
commission of violent crimes. In 2004, almost 28% of violent offenders
in state prison and 24% in federal prison were under the influence of
drugs at the time the offense was committed. 69 Almost 50% of violent
offenders in both state and federal prison admitted drug use in the month
prior to the offense. 70 Another concern is that the commission of
property crimes in order to support a drug habit correlates to escalating
drug use.7' In 2004, 17% of state and 18% of federal prisoners said that
they committed the crime for which they were incarcerated in order to
get money for drugs.72
Attempts to reduce distribution and use of illicit drugs through
increased penalties have been ineffective.7 3 President Richard Nixon first
declared the nation's war on drugs in 1971,74 in part because soldiers
fighting in Vietnam were returning to the United States addicted to
heroin.75 Subsequent legislation attempted to control drug importation
and distribution in the United States through tactics such as the
66. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
ECONOMIC COSTS OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992-2002 § IV-6 (2004), available at

www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/pdf/economic costs.pdf. In 2002, societal costs related to
drug abuse totaled 29.051 billion dollars (9.785 billion dollars was spent on police protection, 2.336
billion dollars on legal adjudication, 14.236 billion dollars on state and federal corrections, and
2.694 billion dollars on local corrections). Id.
67. Id. (finding that in 1992, estimated costs of drug abuse in the criminal justice system were
14.5 billion dollars).
68. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Offenders Statistics,
http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
69. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBL'N NO.
NCJ 213530, DRUG USE AND DEPENDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 2004, at 5, tbl.4

(2006), availableat http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dudsfp04.pdf.
70. Id.
71. See Lurigio, supra note 62, at 496.
72. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Drug Use and Crime,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/duc.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
73. Lurigio, supra note 62, at 496.
74. "I am transmitting legislation to the Congress to consolidate at the highest level a fullscale attack on the problem of drug abuse in America." President Richard Nixon, Special Message
to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (June 17, 1971), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3048.
75. Id.;
see also Dana Adams Schmidt, President Orders Wider Drug Fight; Asks $155Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1971, at 1 (discussing addiction treatment for soldiers serving in
Vietnam).
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establishment of mandatory minimum sentences, 76 increased bail
amounts, and asset forfeiture for drug-related offenses." The harsher
penalties for drug-related offenses were intended to use fear of
punishment to deter drug use.78 However, research has indicated that
neither perceived legal risk nor actual legal penalty is related to the
prevalence of drug use.7 9
Instead, research has indicated that substance abuse treatment is a
more effective method of reduction of drug use and associated crimes
within the criminal offender population. 80 Recognizing this need for
substance abuse treatment, legal coercion has become a common method
of obtaining treatment for substance-abusing criminal offenders. 8' In
2006, the criminal justice system served as the primary source of referral
82
to treatment for substance abusers aged eighteen to twenty-five.
76. President Barack Obama said during his campaign for the presidency that he "would
review mandatory minimum drug sentencing and give first-time, nonviolent drug offenders a chance
to serve their sentence in drug rehabilitation programs instead of prison." Nedra Pickler, I'd Ease
Drug-Sentencing Laws: Obama, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, http://www.suntimes.com/news/
politics/obama/581041 ,CST-NWS-obama30.article.
77. JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT
IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 27 (2001); see also RON CHEPESIUK, THE WAR
ON DRUGS: AN INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 240-41 (1999).
78. COMM'N ON BEHAVIORAL & SOC. SCIS. & EDUC., INFORMING AMERICA'S POLICY ON
ILLEGAL DRUGS: WHAT WE DON'T KNOW KEEPS HURTING US 191 (2001).
79. Id. at 191-92 (summarizing the results of several studies); see also Robert MacCoun &
Peter Reuter, Drug Control, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 207, 213 (Michael

Tonry ed., 1998) (claiming that fear of sanctions does not have a deterrent effect because
"individuals do not use sanctioning risk information in the manner implied by rational choice
models" and that increased severity in sanctioning is counterproductive to the goals of reducing
drug-related offenses). Despite evidence that increased punishment does not result in a decrease of
drug use, federal agencies have claimed the opposite. For example, the Drug Enforcement
Administration asserts that enforcement of drug laws discourages drug use by increasing the legal
risk associated with use, citing as proof an anecdotal Newsweek article written by a self-proclaimed
casual drug user. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPEAKING OUT AGAINST
DRUG LEGALIZATION 7 (2003), available at www.usdoj.gov/dea/demand/speakout/speakingoutmay03.pdf (citing Charles Van Deventer, I'm Proof: The War on Drugs Is Working, NEWSWEEK,
July 2, 2001, http://www.newsweek.com/id/78578); see also MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN
NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 19-24 (1995) (discussing assertions made
by the director of the Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics concerning the inverse
relationship between incarceration and crime rates).
80. Lurigio, supra note 62 at 500-06; see also Frank S. Pearson & Douglas S. Lipton, A Meta-

Analytic Review of the Effectiveness of Corrections-BasedTreatmentsfor Drug Abuse, 79 PRISON J.
384, 405, 407 (1999). But see Farabee et al., supra note 28, at 5, 8 (attributing mixed positive and
negative results to type of program and characteristics of offender).
81. See generally Farabee et al., supra note 28, at 3 (1998) (discussing the referral rate of the
criminal justice system to substance abuse treatment programs).
82. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE DASIS REPORT: FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT
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Involuntary civil commitment into drug and alcohol treatment programs
will enable individuals with diagnosed substance dependence to receive
necessary treatment without requiring prior entry into the criminal
justice system.
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGALLY COERCED SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT

A. Motivation to Change as a Factorin Coerced Treatment
Motivation is considered a critical factor in participation, retention,
and success of drug and alcohol treatment. 83 Individuals entering
substance abuse treatment programs generally report extrinsic, coercive
motivations for seeking treatment including pressure from families and
employers and situations such as homelessness, financial difficulties,
and legal difficulties.84 While "coercion" is frequently thought of as a
legal mandate to enter substance abuse treatment, within addiction
literature the word "coercion" can be used to refer to "a probation
officer's recommendation to enter treatment, a drug court judge's offer
of a choice between treatment or jail, a judge's requirement that the
offender enter treatment as a condition of probation, or a correctional
85
policy of sending inmates involuntarily to a prison treatment program. 86
Although coerced treatment conflicts with the principle of autonomy,
87
mandatory treatment of substance dependence may enable autonomy:
People who are addicted really do not have the full capacity to be selfdetermining or autonomous because their addiction literally coerces

18 TO 25 TO SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT: 2006, at 4 (2008),
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k8/timesTX/timesTX.pdf.
83. Hiller etal., supranote 28, at 56-58.
84. See Marlowe et al., supranote 25, at 78, 81.
85. Farabee et al., supra note 28, at 3.
86. "[Tlhe distinction between voluntary and coerced treatment is critical because coerced or
forced treatment violates the patient's fundamental right to liberty, and the clinician's obligation to
respect patient autonomy." Douglas P. Olsen, Influence and Coercion: Relational and Rights-Based
Ethical Approaches to Forced Psychiatric Treatment, 10 J.PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH
NURSING 705, 707 (2003). Autonomy in health care is defined as "a fundamental expression of
respect for the humanity of patients [that gives] priority to the patients' treatment goals .
ld. at
I..."
706.
87. Arthur L. Caplan, Ethical Issues Surrounding Forced,Mandated, or Coerced Treatment,
31 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 117, 118 (2006). The relationship between coerced treatment
and autonomy suggests a moral imperative in mandating treatment for substance dependence. See
id. at 118, 120.
ADMISSIONS AGED
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their behavior. They cannot be autonomous agents precisely because
they are caught up in the behavioral vice that is addiction. If that is so,
then it may be possible to justify compulsory treatment for finite
periods of time88that could rectify this situation and restore the capacity
for autonomy.
While it has been argued that coerced treatment is likely to fail
because the person may be entering treatment prior to recognizing and
wanting to change problematic behaviors, 89 temporary coerced treatment
may enable autonomous treatment decisions based on intrinsic
motivation, free from coercion imposed by addiction. 90 However, the
assumption that all people referred to treatment by the criminal justice
system lack any intrinsic motivation for treatment is not empirically
supported. 9 1
Although a common goal92 of treatment programs is for clients to
internalize the motivation for treatment and recovery, 93 extrinsic
motivational factors are useful in retaining clients in the substance abuse
program. 94 Retention in substance abuse treatment programs is a primary
concern because research indicates that length of time in treatment is a
significant predictor of positive outcomes, including reducing drug rate
and recidivism into the criminal justice system. 95 Knowledge of the
consequences of failure to succeed in a substance abuse treatment
program, as well as a belief that the consequences will be enforced,
positively affects retention among legally mandated clients.96 As one
study found, "legally referred clients entered treatment earlier in their

88. Id. at 118.
89. Miller, supranote 27, at 89.
90. Caplan, supra note 87, at 119-20 (identifying addiction as a form of coercion because
cravings for the drug control behavior).
91. Farabee et al., supra note 28, at 6 (reporting findings that 50% of clients in a prison-based
treatment program and 40% in a community-based program said that they would have entered the
program without pressure from the criminal justice system); Hiller et al., supra note 28, at 70
(finding a high degree of variability in the intrinsic motivation of offenders referred to substance
abuse treatment by the criminal justice system).
92. The goal of shifting extrinsic motivation to intrinsic may not be necessary, as a recent
study found that "higher levels of employment problems, family problems, mental health, and
physical health problems were related to higher treatment motivation scores." Hiller et al., supra
note 31, at 35.
93. See Carl G. Leukefeld & Frank M. Tims, Compulsory Treatment: A Review of Findings,
in COMPULSORY TREATMENT OF DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 236, 243 (Carl
G. Leukefeld & Frank M. Tims eds., 1988).
94. Farabee et al., supra note 28, at 5.
95. Young, supra note 29, at 28.

96. Id. at 51.
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addiction career than would otherwise have been the case and ... they
stayed in treatment longer-both circumstances that are conducive to
better outcome. 97 Therefore, the extrinsic motivations of clients who are
legally mandated or coerced into substance abuse treatment programs
can increase program retention, thereby increasing positive treatment
outcomes such as reduced drug use and recidivism.

B. Legally MandatedTreatment After Entry into the CriminalJustice
System
It is generally understood within the addiction treatment
community that mere incarceration of substance abusers without
treatment fails to ameliorate the problem,98 and therefore recidivism of
substance use and criminal behavior is likely. 99 Once a substance abuser
enters the criminal justice system, there are several different treatment
modalities that may be available. 00 Programs offered within the prison
system make up the first treatment modality. 0 1 These may range from
intensive, highly structured, residential therapeutic communities, to
outpatient programs (inside the prison setting) consisting of counseling,
peer group support, and vocational counseling. 10 2 In-prison residential
treatment has been shown to be effective in reducing drug use and
criminality, but the need for treatment in prisons exceeds treatment
availability; 10 3 only a small percentage of inmates needing treatment
receive services. 10 4 Therefore, although treatment in prisons is effective,
the demand cannot be fully met. The second treatment modality consists
of programs offered as a condition to probation or parole. 10 5 As most
offenders are managed through probation and parole supervision,
community-based treatment services provide needed drug and alcohol
treatment. 106
97. Farabee et al., supra note 28, at 5.
98. See supranote 23.
99.
100.
101.

See supra Part I.B.
OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supranote 26, at 3.
See id. at 3-4.

102. Id.
103. Matthew L. Hiller et al., Recidivism Following Mandated Residential Substance Abuse
Treatment for Felony Probationers,86 PRISON J. 230, 232 (2006).
104. Lurigio, supra note 62, at 510-11.

105. A recent study on the effectiveness of probation-based treatment was inconclusive. Hiller
et al., supranote 103, at 239.
106.

Seeid.at232.
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Finally, drug treatment within a diversionary program may be
offered as an alternative to incarceration. 10 7 Drug Treatment Courts
emerged in the late 1980s 10 8 and have become a popular method of
treatment as a cost-effective 0 9 alternative to incarceration for substanceabusing offenders. 1 10 A study comparing the effectiveness of drug courts
in New York 11' to prison without treatment found that subsequent arrest
rates of people that completed a drug court program were "29 percent
lower over three years."'1 12 Drug courts have been shown to be highly
effective at reducing drug use and recidivism of criminal behavior 1 3 and
have long-term implications for reducing costs of prosecution,
incarceration, public assistance, and health care. 1 4 As of 2003, New
York had saved an estimated 254 million dollars in prison-related

107. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra note 26, at 4.
108. Id. Drug Treatment Courts had their inception in the United States, but in the late 1990s
Canada also implemented Drug Treatment Courts. The Canadian Drug Treatment Courts were
modeled after the United States Drug Treatment Courts, but modified in order to conform to the
Canadian legal system. Benedikt Fischer et al., Compulsory Drug Treatment in Canada: Historical
Originsand Recent Developments, 8 EUR. ADDICTION RES. 61, 65 (2002).
109. Costs of prosecution and imprisonment are reduced when the "defendant... successfully
divert[s] from the traditional [penal] system." OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra
note 26, at 5 ("For example, the drug court operating in Washington, D.C., has reported that a
defendant processed through a drug court saves the District between $4,065 and $8,845 per client in
jail costs; prosecution costs are also reduced by an estimated $102,000, annually.").
110. Deborah K. Shaffer et al., Examining the Differential Impact of Drug Court Services by
Court Type: Findings from Ohio, 6 DRUG CT. REV. 33, 36 (2008), available at
http://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/ndci/DCRVI 1%5BI %5D.pdf.
111. Although drug courts have been effective, the New York State Commission on Sentencing
Reform has called for reforms in the state's drug laws in order to ensure treatment options are being
offered consistently to eligible drug offenders. N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON SENTENCING REFORM, THE
FUTURE OF SENTENCING IN NEW YORK STATE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 79 (2009),
available
at
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/pio/csrreport2-2009.pdf
[hereinafter
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM]. A 2002 study of the 198 most populated counties in the United
States (including nine counties in New York State) indicated that the number of African-Americans
admitted to prison for drug offenses was twice the number of whites, even though the number of
white drug users is five times higher than African-American drug users. JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE
VORTEX: THE CONCENTRATED RACIAL IMPACT OF DRUG IMPRISONMENT AND THE
CHARACTERISTICS OF PUNITIVE COUNTIES 10 (2007), www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/0712_REPVortexAC-DP.pdf. In part because of racial disparities in prisons across the country and
in New York, the Commission on Sentencing Reform recommended establishing a "uniform
statewide diversion program for drug-addicted non-violent felony offenders" in order to ensure that
treatment is available to all criminal offenders meeting eligibility criteria. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REFORM, supra, at 78-79.
112. Paul von Zielbauer, Court Treatment System Is Found to Help Drug Offenders Stay
Clean, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at 33.
113. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra note 26, at 4-5.
114. Charles J. Hynes, ProsecutionBacks Alternative to Prisonfor Drug Addicts, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 2004, at 28, 30.
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expenses by diverting eligible" 5 drug offenders into drug courts in lieu
of incarceration." 16
The target population of drug courts is generally non-violent
offenders with substantial addiction problems. 1 7 Drug courts are not
intended for individuals with long criminal histories.' 18 Defendants often
plead guilty in exchange for a deferred judgment or probation,
19
conditioned on successful completion of the drug court program.
Similar to civil commitment for substance dependence, drug courts may
be considered an early intervention program for individuals suffering
from substance addiction. 2 °
Drug courts adopt a team approach to treating offenders, bringing
together treatment providers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges. 12 The treatment model combines community-based treatment
122
(outpatient, residential, or a combination) with judicial supervision.
The programs are designed to last a significant length of time in order to
improve treatment outcomes. 123 Participants submit to regular drug
screening and appear before the court frequently. 124 Rewards for

115. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
116. See von Zielbauer, supranote 112.
117. CARY HECK, NAT'L DRUG COURT INST., MONOGRAPH SERIES 6, LOCAL DRUG COURT
RESEARCH: NAVIGATING PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND PROCESS EVALUATIONS 4 (2006),
available at http://www.ndci.org/publications/NRACReport.pdf, see also RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REFORM, supra note I 11, at 97 (recommending a ."Judicial Diversion'
model which would
provide the possibility of diversion to treatment for both first- and second-time non-violent felony
drug offenders).
118. See HECK, supra note 117, at 4.
119. Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1462
(2000). But see Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1211-12 (1998) (discussing due process concerns because
failure to successfully complete the drug court program may result in a lengthier incarceration than
would have been imposed had the defendant been initially adjudicated in a traditional criminal
court); Fischer et al., supra note 108, at 66 ("The fact that many offenders have to plead guilty to
their charge in order to enter the drug treatment court may represent a threat to offenders' due
process rights. These constitutionally protected rights are often undermined under circumstances of
termination of treatment for non-compliance and redirection to the traditional criminal justice
process.").
120. See HECK, supra note 117, at 4.
121. Lurigio, supra note 62, at 508.
122. See id.; MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE NEW YORK STATE
ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: POLICIES, PARTICIPANTS AND IMPACTS 18 (2003).
123. See Lurigio, supra note 62, at 515 (finding that duration of treatment is positively related
to treatment outcome and that three to nine months is the ideal treatment duration); see also REMPEL
ET AL., supra note 122, at 20 (stating that of the New York drug courts evaluated, six of the eleven
drug courts require at least one year of participation prior to successful completion of the program).
124. Lurigio, supra note 62, at 508.
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progress may include fewer court appearances and less intensive
treatment, whereas participants may receive community
service or short
12 5
jail stays as sanctions for program noncompliance.
The existence and value of the legally coercive nature of drug
courts has been a subject of debate within the addictions field.126 An
argument has been made that drug courts are really "voluntary programs
that do not diminish the right to refuse treatment."' 127 Eligible defendants
are given the choice between the drug court program and traditional case
processing. 128 However, traditional case processing frequently involves
incarceration, and the significance of that pressure should be viewed as
potentially coercive. 29 "When coercion is employed in the drug
treatment court system, it does not involve forcing the defendant to
receive treatment ... it is the careful leverage of judicial authority to
encourage the offender to choose the most statistically probable
opportunity for rehabilitation and a better life."'"3 Additionally, drug
courts may be justifiably' 3' coercive because of the positive relationship
between perceived legal coercion and retention in treatment and the
subsequent correlation to positive treatment outcomes.' 32 Drug courts are
an effective method of diverting people with substance abuse problems
out of the criminal justice system while providing them with the
treatment necessary to reduce alcohol and illicit drug use.
C. Legally MandatedTreatment in the Civil System
Civil commitment of individuals suffering from substance
dependence provides a method of coercing the person into treatment

125. Id.; Patricia L. Arabia et al., Sanctioning Practices in an Adult Felony Drug Court, 6
DRUG CT. REv. 1, 6 (2008), http://www.ndci.org/publications/DCRVII.pdf.
126. Marlowe et al., supra note 25, at 77.
127. Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First
Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REv. 717, 746
(2008).
128. Id.
129. See Toby Seddon, Coerced Drug Treatment in the Criminal Justice System: Conceptual,
Ethical and CriminologicalIssues, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 269, 278 (2007).

130. Hora & Stalcup, supra note 127, at 753.
131. "Some commentators have directly linked the question of ethics with that of effectiveness,
arguing that coerced treatment is only ethically justifiable if it achieves positive outcomes." Seddon,
supra note 129, at 280.
132. See supra Part HI.A.
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without requiring entry into the criminal justice system.'33 "Civil
commitment is a legal procedure that allows narcotics addicts or other
drug addicts to be committed to a compulsory drug treatment program,
typically involving a residential period and an aftercare period in the
community."' 134 Early intervention of coerced treatment, without
necessitating entry into the criminal justice system, may reduce social
costs associated with substance dependence. 135
Civil commitment for substance abuse is accepted within the
international community. In 1967, the World Health Organization
("WHO") 136 issued a statement proclaiming that "[a]dequate treatment
and rehabilitation should, if necessary, be ensured by civil commitment
of drug-dependent persons to medical authority, which would provide
direction and supervision of their care, from initial diagnosis to
rehabilitation."' 37 Twenty-one years later, WHO continues to support
compulsory treatment of substance dependence "in exceptional crisis
situations of high risk to self or others .... ,,38 Civil laws in some

European countries allow for commitment of substance dependent
individuals. '" Although in the United States many state statutes do not
133.

See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 43

(2005) (discussing that deprivation of liberty generally requires a finding of guilt in the criminal
justice system, but that the purpose of civil commitment is preventative detention).
134. M. Douglas Anglin & Yih-lng Hser, Legal Coercion and Drug Abuse Treatment:
Research Findings and Social Policy Implications, in HANDBOOK OF DRUG CONTROL IN THE
UNITED STATES 151, 152 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1990).
135. Brian R. Rush & T. Cameron Wild, Substance Abuse Treatment and Pressuresfrom the
Criminal Justice System: Datafrom a Provincial Client Monitoring System, 98 ADDICTION 1119,
1120 (2003).
136. The U.N. encourages WHO to work "with governments with a view to facilitating access
to drug treatment programs and to strengthen the capacity of primary health care programs to
respond to drug-related health problems." Lane Porter, Comparative Drug Treatment Policies and
Legislation, 29 INT'L LAW. 697, 703 (1995).
137. WHO, Servicesfor the Prevention and Treatment of Dependence on Alcohol and Other
Drugs, at 42,
WHO Technical
Rep.
Ser.
No. 363 (1967),
available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/trs/WHO TRS 363.pdf.
138. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WHO, DISCUSSION PAPER: PRINCIPLES OF DRUG
DEPENDENCE TREATMENT 10 (2008), http://www.who.int/entity/substanceabuse/publications/
principles-drugdependence treatment.pdf.
139. Loi f~drale sur les stupdfiants [Federal Narcotics Act], Oct. 3, 1951, Recueil
systematique du droit f~ddral
[RO] 812.121,
art.
15b, (Switz.) available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/812_121/al 5b.html (permitting involuntary hospitalization of drugdependent persons for the purpose of treatment); Lag om vrd av missbrukare i vissa fall (Svensk
fdrfattningssamling [SFS] 1988:870) (Swed.), translated in The Care of Alcoholics, Drug Abusers
and Abusers of Volatile Solvents (Special Provisions) Act, LVM 1989, SFS 1988:870, availableat
http://www.unodc.org/enl/showDocument.do?lng-fr&language=FRE&documentUid=693
(permitting civil commitment of persons abusing alcohol or drugs, provided that "as a result of the

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss4/9

18

Abensur: What's So Civil About Civil Commitment?: Balancing the State's In
2009]

WHAT'S SO CIVIL ABOUT CIVIL COMMITMENT?

permit civil commitment for substance abuse, 140 several states do have
legislation allowing for civil commitment of substance abusers. 141
Social and legal coercion are considered key elements of civil
commitment for substance dependence. 142 Social pressures, including
legal social controls like court-ordered treatment, employee assistance
programs, and persuasive interpersonal controls initiated by family or
friends, are an important part of the process of initiating treatment for
substance dependence. 143 Entry into treatment without legal coercion
may still not be completely voluntary, as family members, friends, and
employers are often an important part of the decision to seek treatment
through their comments, suggestions, and efforts to control the substance
use. 144 Family members can generally initiate civil commitment
proceedings,' 45 thus emphasizing the importance of social pressures in
coerced treatment.
Most empirical research on coerced treatment focuses on the
criminal justice system; 146 however, civil commitment has been shown
to be effective in reducing substance use. California's Civil Addict

abuse, be [1] is seriously endangering his physical or mental health. [sic] [2] runs an obvious risk of
ruining his life, or [3] is liable to inflict serious injury on himself or some person closely related to
him."); see also Bourquin-Ti~che et al., supra note 32, at 49 (discussing civil codes in Europe that
permit civil commitment of alcoholics and illicit drug users); Esther Grichting et al., Modes and
Impact of Coercive Inpatient Treatment for Drug-Related Conditions in Switzerland, 8 EUR.
ADDICTION RES. 78, 79 (2002) (discussing involuntary civil commitment for drug dependence in
Switzerland); Porter, supra note 136, at 712 (discussing Swedish legislation that enables involuntary
civil commitment for substance dependence treatment). See generally Jessica Palm & Kerstin
Stenius, Sweden: IntegratedCompulsory Treatment, 8 EUR. ADDICTION RES. 69 (2002) (providing
an overview of how the Swedish statute permitting compulsory substance abuse treatment is
applied).
140. E.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 22.09(e) (McKinney 2006) (prohibiting involuntary
substance dependence treatment). However, substance dependence does not prevent the civil
commitment of a person suffering from a concurrent mental illness. N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
37
LAW § 9. (g) (McKinney 2008).
141. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 35 (West 2003) (permitting involuntary
commitment of alcoholics or substance abusers for up to thirty days); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-287
(2007) (permitting involuntary commitment of substance abusers for up to 180 days).
142. See T. Cameron Wild, Social Control and Coercion in Addiction Treatment. Towards
Evidence-Based Policy and Practice, 101 ADDICTION 40,40 (2006).
143. Id.
144. See WHO, supra note 23, at 64.
145. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 35
initiate civil commitment proceedings); N.C.
individual who has knowledge of a substance
initiate civil commitment proceedings).
146. Bourquin-Ti~che et al., supra note 32,

(West 2003) (allowing a spouse or blood relative to
GEN. STAT. § 122C-281 (2007) (allowing "[a]ny
abuser who is dangerous to himself or others" to
at 49.
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Program ("CAP"), which was established by 1961 legislation, 147 allowed

for the civil commitment of anyone addicted to drugs. 148 Although
generally CAP was used to divert people arrested for drug related

offenses or property crimes from the traditional criminal justice
system,1 49 CAP had a provision permitting involuntary commitment of
people who had not been charged with a crime. 150 CAP was effective in

reducing daily narcotics use"' as well as criminal recidivism. 15 2 CAP's
success indicates that civil commitment can have an important effect on
reducing drug use among substance-dependent individuals. 53 These
findings are supported by a more recent study evaluating the
1 54
effectiveness of civil commitment of people dependent on alcohol.
The study reports a positive correlation between civil commitment and
long-term abstinence from alcohol.1 55 Thus, involuntary civil

commitment for substance dependence effectively reduces drug use and
should be an option for treatment.

147. The Supreme Court stated in dicta that a state could enact legislation that enabled civil
commitment for substance abuse. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962) ("In the
interest of discouraging the violation of such laws, or in the interest of the general health or welfare
of its inhabitants, a State might establish a program of compulsory treatment for those addicted to
narcotics. Such a program of treatment might require periods of involuntary confinement. And penal
sanctions might be imposed for failure to comply with established compulsory treatment
procedures.") (citation omitted).
148. Anglin & Hser, supranote 134, at 153.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 152.
15 1. Id. at 153 (reporting a reduction of drug use by 21.8%, seven years after commitment, as
compared to a 6.8% reduction among those not civilly committed).
152. Id. (reporting a reduction of criminal activities by 18.6%, seven years after commitment,
as compared to a 6.7% reduction among those not civilly committed).
153. See M. Douglas Anglin, The Efficacy of Civil Commitment in Treating Narcotic
Addiction, in COMPULSORY TREATMENT OF DRUG ABUSE, supranote 93, at 11.

154. Bourquin-Ti~che et al., supranote 32, at 51-52.
155. Id. at 51. Limitations to this study should be noted, however. This study involved a small
sample and no control group and therefore implicates the need for more research rather than broad
conclusions. However, it is important to recognize that the results in this study are consistent with
the evaluation of CAP. Therefore, although there are few studies on the efficacy of civil
commitment for substance dependence, the studies that have been conducted consistently indicate
positive outcomes, such as reduced substance use and abstinence from alcohol and drugs. See id. at
54; Anglin, supranote 153, at 11; Anglin & Hser, supra note 134, at 153.
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IV. EXISTING LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON INVOLUNTARY CIVIL
COMMITMENT FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE

A. ProceduralDue ProcessRights
Legislatures must consider the rights afforded by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 56 when drafting a statute for civil
commitment for substance dependence. Procedural due process rights
require that certain procedural safeguards be in place, such as a hearing
and a right to counsel. 57 An individual cannot be civilly committed for
substance dependence without a 58fair procedure to determine his
dangerousness to himself or others.
While the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the procedures
required, 59 in Mathews v. Eldridge160 it identified three factors to
consider when determining if the procedures in place adequately
protected the individual's due process rights:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probative
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural
6'
entail.'
would
requirement
The sufficiency of the procedures a state puts in place for a civil
commitment of substance abuse is determined by using the Mathews
factors.162 However, since the Court has not determined specific
procedures to be necessary,163 there are many procedures that a state can

156. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
157. Michael P. Rosenthal, The Constitutionality of Involuntary Civil Commitment of Opiate
Addicts, 18 J. DRUG ISSUES 641, 643 (1988).
158. JoHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.4 (5th ed. 1995).
159. Id.
160. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
161. Id. at 335.
162. Id.
163. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 158, § 13.4.
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adopt in order to ensure that the procedural due process rights are
protected.
One procedure that states implement in order to safeguard the
individual's rights is a hearing. 64 Due process may not always require
an immediate hearing so long as the other procedures in place
sufficiently protect the individual's rights, as indicated by the Mathews
test. 165 However, continuation of a challenged civil commitment without
a hearing would violate the individual's due process rights. 166 At the
hearing, the state must establish the substantive elements by clear and
convincing evidence; 167 however, state legislatures are permitted to
impose a higher burden of proof on the state, so long as there is a
rational basis to do So.168
Another procedural issue that is specific to commitment for
substance dependence is whether parents and close relatives can
participate as parties in the proceeding. 169 Family may have information
about the individual's drug use and the impact such use has on every day
life. This information can be valuable to the court in deciding whether
the individual is dependent on a substance, and whether there is likely to
be harm because of substance use.' 70 Although the family members may
have interests adverse to the interests of the individual facing
commitment, 17 the Court in Heller found that a rule permitting close
relatives as parties was not a violation of the person's procedural due
process rights in a mental retardation commitment hearing.' 72 The Court

164. Ibur v. State, 765 So. 2d 275, 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that appellant had
a
due process right to be present and testify at involuntary commitment hearing).
165. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
166. Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1062 (2d Cir. 1995).
167. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979); e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-287
(2007) (The court must find "by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent is a
substance abuser and is dangerous to himself or others .... ).
168. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 325 (1993) (upholding Kentucky's civil commitment
procedures that required a clear and convincing evidence standard for mental retardation, but a
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard for mental illness).
169. See id.
at 330.
170. Seeid.at331.
171. Id. But see Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the
Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, princ. 1(6), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/119/Annex (Dec. 17, 1991) [hereinafter Principles] ("The counsel shall not in the same
proceedings represent a mental health facility or its personnel and shall not also represent a member
of the family of the person whose capacity is at issue unless the tribunal is satisfied that there is no
conflict of interest.").
172. Heller, 509 U.S. at 330-31.
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factors, and held that procedural
evaluated the rule using the Mathews
173
protected:
sufficiently
were
rights
[W]e simply do not understand how [family members']
participation as formal parties in the commitment
proceedings increases "the risk of an erroneous
interest.
liberty
of
respondents'
deprivation,"
Rather,... these

parties

often

will

have

valuable

will increase the
information that, if placed before the court,
1 74
decision.
commitment
the
of
accuracy
Like family members of individuals with mental retardation, family
members of people addicted to drugs and alcohol are likely to have
information concerning the extent and impact of the addiction on the
individual's life 175 that would reduce "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation"' 176 of liberty. Therefore, it is probable that the Heller
decision would be extended to permit family members as parties in
substance dependence commitment hearings.
The right to counsel is another procedural safeguard. 177 The
Supreme Court has not decided if there is a constitutional right to
counsel in civil commitment hearings. 178 The Court has, however, said in
dicta that there is a right to appointed counsel when loss of the case
would result in depriving an indigent litigant of his physical liberty, 79
which should be read to include civil commitment.180 Some state courts

173. Id.
174. Id.at 331 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
175. See MARINA BARNARD, DRUG ADDICTION AND FAMILIES 25 (2007) (discussing
behavioral changes attributed to drug use often noticed by family members).
176. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
177. John Parry, Involuntary Civil Commitment in the 90s: A ConstitutionalPerspective, 18
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 320, 325 (1994).

178. Id.But see Principles, supra note 171, at princ. 1(6) ("The person whose capacity is at
issue shall be entitled to be represented by a counsel. If the person whose capacity is at issue does
not himself or herself secure such representation, it shall be made available without payment by that
person to the extent that he or she does not have sufficient means to pay for it.").
179. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981); see also Joseph Frueh, Note,
The Anders Brief in Appeals from Civil Commitment, 118 YALE L.J. 272, 283 (2008) ("[T]he
[Lassiter] Court effectively proclaimed that appointed counsel was imperative in any proceeding
that threatened the loss of physical liberty.").
180. "Due to the analytical link to criminal law, most respondents in civil commitment have
the right to counsel appointed and paid by the state... Jennifer L. Wright, Protecting Who From
What, and Why, and How?: A Proposal for an Integrative Approach to Adult Protective
Proceedings, 12 ELDER L.J. 53, 65 (2004).
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have subsequently found that the right to counsel attaches when
involuntary commitment is sought,' 8' and state legislation on civil
commitment for substance dependence may provide for counsel during
the proceedings. 182 Courts have also found that waiver of counsel in a
civil commitment hearing must be done intelligently or the waiver is
invalid. 83 However, even in jurisdictions that provide counsel to
indigent individuals in civil commitment proceedings, the quality of the
84
representation is inconsistent.'
There are two models of client representation followed by
attomeys-the "'adversarial' approach" and the "'best interests'
approach.' ' 185 An attorney following the adversarial approach "acts as a
zealous advocate for his client's wishes, which usually are against
hospitalization, regardless of whether he believes that the client needs
treatment."' 186 In mental health courts, attorneys generally follow the best
187
interests approach, deferring to the findings of the state psychiatrist.
Attorneys acting under the best interests approach presume that the
mentally ill need state protection and exhibit paternalistic behavior in
commitment proceedings. 188 The non-adversarial role of defense
attorneys in civil commitment proceedings is consistent with the role of
defense attorneys in other mental health legal proceedings, including
Drug Treatment Courts.189 The Supreme Court has justified judicial
181. In re Commitment of S.L., 462 A.2d 1252, 1259 (N.J. 1983); see also Ibur v. State, 765
So. 2d 275, 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that there is a due process right to be represented
by counsel at an involuntary commitment hearing).
182. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 35 (West 2003) ("The person shall have the right
to be represented by legal counsel .... If the court finds the person indigent, it shall immediately
appoint counsel."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-286(d) (2007) ("If the respondent is
indigent... counsel shall be appointed to represent the respondent .... ").
183. E.g., Honor v. Yamuchi, 820 S.W.2d 267, 270-71 (Ark. 1991).
184. Michael L. Perlin, FatalAssumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in
Mental Disability Cases, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 43-45 (1992) (discussing the historic
inadequacies of meaningful counsel in involuntary civil commitment hearings).
185. Christyne E. Ferris, Note, The Search for Due Process in Civil Commitment Hearings:
How ProceduralRealities Have Altered Substantive Standards, 61 VAND. L. REv. 959, 962 (2008).
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 970-71.
189. Boldt, supra note 119, at 1245. In Drug Treatment Courts,
defense counsel is no longer primarily responsible for giving voice to the distinct
perspective of the defendant's experience in what remains a coercive setting. Rather,
defense counsel becomes part of a treatment team working with others to insure that
outcomes, viewed from the perspective of the institutional players and not the individual
defendant, are in the defendant's best interests.
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deference to psychiatrists in civil commitment proceedings, explaining
that the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis cannot be avoided by shifting
the decision to the court because the court will reasonably defer to the
medical professional when making medical decisions.1 90 The Court

noted that "the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to
determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment

and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory
than real." 191 However, judicial deference to medical opinions does not
justify an attorney's deference to the opinion of a state doctor when:

"The primary role of a respondent's counsel is to represent the
perspective of the respondent and to serve as a vigorous advocate for the
respondent's wishes. It is not to substitute his or her judgment about
what is in the best interests of the respondent."1' 92 Defense attorney
deference to the state doctor's opinion about the necessity of civil

commitment is inconsistent with
the client's presumed interest in
193
remaining free from confinement.
The best interests approach is contrary to the traditional clientlawyer relationship, 194 where even in cases of a client with diminished

capacity, the attorney and client should maintain a normal client-attorney
relationship, as far as reasonably possible. 195 One critic of the best

interest approach suggests that attorneys believe they act in the best
interests of their clients when, in fact, prejudices against the mentally
ill 196 cause attorneys to "roll over and play dead in civil commitment

190. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
429 (1979) ("Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and is
in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert
psychiatrists and psychologists.").
191. Parham,442 U.S. at 609.
192.

ELIZABETH H. STANN & INGO KEILITZ, NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, IMPROVING

THE PRACTICE OF INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT 86 (1989).
193. Ferris, supra note 185, at 969-70 ("[M]entally ill patients may not be able to express their
desires cogently; in that case, the adversarial attorney will presume that the client favors liberty over
commitment. This approach respects the autonomy of the patient by assuming that he can make his
own decisions regarding his care and that he deserves freedom unless it can be proven otherwise.");
accord Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, EthicalIssues in the Representationof Individuals in
the Commitment Process,45 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 173 (1982).
194. "The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when
properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2007).
195. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2007). "Reasonably" "denotes the conduct
of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2007).
196. Grant H. Morris, PursuingJusticefor the Mentally Disabled,42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 757,
766 (2005) (arguing that the belief that mentally ill people are unable to determine what is best for
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often

last

only

minutes, 198

and have been described as "perfunctory rituals that either
presume the existence of mental illness and satisfaction of the
commitment criteria or only superficially inquire into these issues." 199
Lawyers who take the best interests approach often fail to investigate the
facts offered by the state supporting the need for involuntary
commitment. 200 They perform little or no cross-examination of the
state's expert witnesses 20 1 do not seek less restrictive alternatives than
Aofe
f' no contradiction to the state's allegations
often offer
commitment, 202 and
20 3
of mental illness.
The best interests approach that is so common in commitment
hearings "has turned the adversarial model into a farce and a mockery in
which procedural rights are accorded in only a formal way so as to
effectuate what judges, lawyers, and clinicians perceive to be the best
interests of the patient.",204 The best interests approach undermines the
procedural protections afforded by the Due Process Clause.20 5
Instead, in order to provide effective counsel, attorneys representing
substance dependent patients against whom the state is seeking
commitment should proceed under the adversarial approach.20 6 A
them and that courts should rely on the opinions of doctors is based on a prejudice against the
mentally ill).
197. Id.
198. WINICK, supra note 133, at 144 (reporting that commitment hearings last an average of
3.8 to 9.2 minutes).
199. Id. But see K.W. v. Logansport State Hosp., 660 N.E.2d 609, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that allegations that the attorney's counsel was "perfunctory" in a recommitment
proceeding did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel).
200. WINICK, supranote 133, at 144; accordFerris, supra note 185, at 972.
201. WINICK, supra note 133, at 144; accord Ferris,supra note 185, at 972. State law may also
specifically identify the right of the respondent to present independent expert or other testimony to
contradict the state's evidence. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 35 (West 2003).
202. WINICK, supranote 133, at 144; accordFerris,supra note 185, at 972.
203.

WINICK, supra note 133, at 144.

204.

Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J.

CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 41 (1999).

205. Id. at 43.
206. "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)
(involving a criminal proceeding). The two-pronged test for ineffective counsel created by
Strickland requires both that counsel's performance was below the standard of reasonableness and a
determination that had counsel's performance been reasonable, the outcome of the trial would have
been different. Id. at 687. Many states have adopted the Strickland standard into civil commitment
proceedings because of the potential for substantial loss of liberty. E.g., Pope v. Alston, 537 So. 2d
953, 956-57 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (using Strickland standard to reject an ineffective counsel claim
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person's right to freedom from restraint, a right which may be taken
away at civil commitment hearings, is so important that it is imperative
that the attorney zealously advocates for the client's wishes, regardless
of what the attorney believes is in the best interest of the client.20 7
Although mandatory treatment of substance dependence may enable
autonomy,20 8 the presumption 2 9 of the adversarial attorney that the
client does not want to be committed serves as a check on the state's
powers. Inadequate procedural safeguards also risk violating substantive
due process, because when an attorney does not serve as a zealous
advocate for his client, it reduces the state's burden of proving the
substantive dangerousness standard.2 1 °
B. Substantive Due ProcessRights
Legislation for civil commitment for substance abuse must meet the
substantive due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 211
The substantive due process right triggered by civil commitment grants
that an individual is to be free from unnecessary bodily restraint, unless
a mentally ill individual is found to be a danger to himself or others.2 12
2 13 legislatures and lower courts assumed
After Robinson v. California,
that a state could enact legislation permitting civil commitment of
narcotic addicts.214 Although Robinson could be read to suggest that
involuntary commitment laws would be permitted so long as the state
has a rational basis for the legislation,2 15 courts have recognized that
based on insufficient contact with attorney before hearing because attorney cross-examined
witnesses and forcefully argued his client's position); In re Mental Commitment of Grey B., No. 991781-FT, 1999 WL 970895, at *2 (Wis.Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1999) (using Strickland standard to reject
an ineffective counsel claim because of attorney's failure to object to the state's expert witness). But
see Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A Callfora Stricter
Test in Civil Commitments, 27 J. LEGAL PROF. 37, 60 (2003) (arguing that the Strickland standard in
civil commitment hearings fails to adequately protect people facing involuntarily commitment
because Stricklandhas a presumption in favor of the attorney).
207. John J. McCullough, III & Joseph A. Reinert, The Necessity of Individual Rights and
ProceduralJustice in the Civil Commitment Process: A Response to the Notion of "Therapeutic
Justice: [sic], VT. B.J., June 2002, at 51, 52.
208. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
210. Ferris, supra note 185, at 974-75; see also Part IV.B.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

212.
213.
214.
215.
violation

NOWAK&ROTUNDA, supranote 158, § 13.4(a).
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962); see supra note 147.
Rosenthal, supra note 157, at 644.
The Court's statement that such treatment be "[i]n the interest of discouraging the
of such laws, or in the interest of the general health or welfare of its inhabitants ...
"
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"[a]n involuntary civil commitment is a 'massive curtailment of
liberty[]' .... ,,2i6 Therefore, in order to comply with due process
requirements, civil
commitment laws are justified only by a "compelling
217
state interest.,

Traditional justifications of state intrusion on individual liberty
include the state's police power 2 18 and parens patriae.21 Both of these
2 2 ° where the
justifications were used in O'Connor v. Donaldson,
Supreme Court held that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family
members or friends., 22 1 The Court held that the state must show at least
one of the following three justifications for civil commitment: danger to
self or others, inability to care for oneself, or the necessity of treatment
to cure a mental illness.

222

Additionally, the overall effectiveness of

suggests that commitment laws are constitutional if related to a public good. Robinson, 370 U.S. at
664-65. Deprivation of "garden variety... libert[ies] ... is constitutional if rationally necessary to
the achievement of a public good." JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASESCOMMENTS-QUESTIONS 377 (10th ed. 2006) (quoting Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the

FourteenthAmendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981, 1030 (1979)); see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 580 (1975) ("Commitment must be justified on the basis of a legitimate state
interest....").
216. Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1061 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)
("Indeed, '[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.' . . . This interest survives
criminal conviction and incarceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary commitment."
(quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))). But see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26
(1905) ("[Tlhe liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its
jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.").
217. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process clause to "forbid[] the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at
all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest").
218. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 296 (1982) (discussing a state's "police power interest in
maintaining order within the institution and in preventing violence").
219. Id. (identifying a state's "parenspatriae interest in alleviating the sufferings of mental
illness and in providing effective treatment"). Parenspatriae is defined as "the state in its capacity
as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1144 (8th ed. 2004).
220. 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (discussing the historic exercise of state police and parens
patriaepowers).
221. Id. at 576.
222. Id. at 573-74, 576; see also Principles, supra note 171, at princ. l1(6)(b) ("An
independent authority [who], having in its possession all relevant information,... is satisfied
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compelled treatment is important when a court mandates civil
commitment because the Court has held civilly committed mentally
retarded individuals have a constitutional right to minimally adequate
habilitation. 2 3 The Court's holding that "liberty interests require the
State to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint" 224 should be extended to other
reasons for civil commitment, including substance dependence.
State police power provides the justification of civil commitment
based on a finding that the individual is dangerous to others, in that the
state has a strong interest in protecting the community from dangerous
individuals 2 As the state's parens patriae interest is in protecting
individuals whose illness makes them unable to make rational treatment
decisions, it provides the justification for civil commitment based on
danger to 22oneself,
inability to care for oneself, and the necessity of
6
treatment.
State statutes permitting involuntary civil commitment for
substance dependence must integrate the O'Connor dangerousness
standard into the legislation. For example, the Massachusetts statute on
civil commitment for substance abuse requires that the court find the
person "is an alcoholic or substance abuser and there is a likelihood of
serious harm as a result of his alcoholism or substance abuse ....
Similarly, North Carolina requires that the respondent be "a substance
abuser and.., dangerous to himself or others.
,228 In order to
commit an individual, the state must demonstrate
dangerousness
by
"clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. ' 229
However, the O'Connor dangerousness standard is too broad to
23
adequately protect the liberty rights of the substance-dependent person 0
that,.., having regard to the patient's own safety or the safety of others, the patient unreasonably
withholds such consent" [may administer treatment without the patient's consent].).
223. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
224. Id. "The basic requirement of adequacy ... may be stated as that training which is
reasonable in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case." Id. at 319
n.25. When determining what is reasonable, deference should be given to the judgments of qualified
professionals. Id. at 322-23.
225. WINICK, supranote 133, at 43.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.at 42.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 35 (West 2003).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-287 (2007).
Id; see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983).
But see Alison Pfeffer, Note, "Imminent Danger" and Inconsistency: The Need for

National Reform of the "'Imminent Danger" Standardfor Involuntary Civil Commitment in the

Wake of the Virginia Tech Tragedy, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 277, 302 (2008) (discussing the argument
that the imminent danger and overt act requirements are under-inclusive and unreasonable).
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because it requires neither an overt act nor a likelihood of imminent
danger.23 1 Instead, the mere inability to help oneself may be sufficient
proof of dangerousness to oneself.232 As substance dependence involves
persistent and compulsive drug-taking behavior despite negative
consequences, 233 a finding of substance dependence alone may be
sufficient proof that an individual is "helpless to avoid the hazards of
freedom, ' 234 according to the O'Connor standard. However, the
sufficiency of a finding of substance dependence to demonstrate
of
dangerousness is contrary to O'Connor, which held that a finding 236
mental illness 235 alone does not justify involuntary civil commitment.
Instead, the state must also meet the dangerousness standard.237
Although the imminent danger standard is still used, broader standards
such as "substantially probable" harm have been upheld.23 8 North
Carolina's statute on civil commitment for substance abuse defines
danger to oneself even more broadly, requiring a finding of "reasonable
probability" of either serious physical debilitation, suicide, or selfmutilation in the near future.239
While inpatient civil commitment for substance dependence should
be an option, because it is a "massive curtailment of liberty, '240 it should
only be imposed when the court finds that a lesser restrictive alternative

231. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the New
York civil commitment scheme for mental illness met the due process requirements despite its lack
of an overt act requirement).
232. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.9 (1975) ("[E]ven if there is no foreseeable
risk of self-injury or suicide, a person is literally 'dangerous to himself' if for physical or other
reasons he is helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom either through his own efforts or with the aid
of willing family members or friends.").
233. Jordi Cami & Magi Farr6, Mechanisms of Disease: Drug Addiction, 349 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 975, 975 (2003); see supranotes 33-34 and accompanying text.
234. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 574 n.9.
235. "The American Psychiatric Association strongly and unequivocally affirms its position
that all substance-related disorders are diagnosable mental illnesses for which effective treatments
are readily available." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, INCLUSION OF SUBSTANCE-RELATED DISORDERS
AS PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS IN ANY PROGRAM DESIGNED TO ASSURE ACCESS AND QUALITY OF
CARE FOR PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: POSITION STATEMENT 1 (2002), available at
http://archive.psych.org/edu/otherres/libarchives/archives/200213.pdf.
236. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575 ("A finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a State's
locking a person up against his will .... ").
237. Id. at 573-74; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (finding that the
Court has upheld civil commitment statutes that couple proof of dangerousness with mental illness).
238. See generally In re Commitment of Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d 851 (Wis. 2002) (upholding a
civil commitment statute with a broader standard than imminent danger).
239. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(11) (2007).
240. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980).
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would be inadequate. The Court stated that even if the government has a
legitimate purpose, "that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.",24' This has been interpreted by many states to
require that civil commitment be the least restrictive alternative, thus
requiring the court to consider
other options such as outpatient and
242
treatment.
community-based
Permitting involuntary commitment for the lesser standard of
substance abuse 243 will result in confinement of individuals for whom
less restrictive alternatives, such as outpatient programs, may be just as
effective. 2 " In Kansas v. Hendricks,24 5 the Court said that it is the role of
the legislature, not the courts, to define medical terms used within
statutes, and the Court did not require the use of specific terminology.2 46
However, unlike in Hendricks, the use of "substance abuse" in
commitment laws does not "narrow[] the class of persons eligible for
247
confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness.,
Rather, "substance abuse" is over-inclusive 248 and is likely to result in an
erroneous deprivation of liberty.24 9 Instead, civil commitment laws
should be narrowly tailored, requiring a finding of substance dependence
rather than substance abuse.

241. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
242. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.2(3) (1993) (permitting involuntary hospitalization for
substance abuse if there is "no suitable alternative available through existing facilities and programs
which would be less restrictive than hospitalization"); see also Principles, supra note 171, at princ.
9(1) ("Every patient shall have the right to be treated in the least restrictive environment and with
the least restrictive or intrusive treatment appropriate to the patient's health needs and the need to
protect the physical safety of others.").
243. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part III.
245. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
246. Id. at 358-60 (rejecting Hendricks' contention that "a 'mental abnormality' is not the
equivalent to a 'mental illness"' and upholding legislation enabling civil commitment due to the
mental abnormality of sex offenders).
247. Id. at 358.
248. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(36) (2007) ("'Substance abuse' means the
pathological use or abuse of alcohol or other drugs in a way or to a degree that produces an
impairment in personal, social, or occupational functioning.") (emphasis added).
249. Cf Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 331 (1993). But see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
429 (1979) ("It cannot be said, therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill person to 'go free'
than for a mentally normal person to be committed.").
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Court has found that it is the role of the state legislatures to
write civil commitment statutes and to define the terminology used
within those statutes. 250 The unwillingness of the Court to involve itself
in the legislative role of deciding the circumstances necessary for civil
commitment has resulted in variations between states' civil commitment
laws, especially concerning civil commitment for substance
dependence. 2 1 Among states that have statutes for involuntary civil
commitment for alcohol or drug related reasons, there are gaps between
the procedural and substantive due process rights facially protected by
the statutes and the rights that are actually protected by the practice of
the courts.252 In order to address these inconsistencies, a model statute
must be proposed by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration ("SAMHSA"), a federal agency under the Department of
Health and Human Services. 253 The Law on Civil Commitment of
Substance Dependant Individuals may be stated as follows:
(1) A family member, friend, doctor, clergy, or member of the law
enforcement may petition
the court for the civil commitment of a
254
substance dependent individual.
(2)A hearing shall occur during which:
(a) the respondent is present; and
(b) the respondent may be represented by counsel of his choice; if
the respondent is indigent, counsel shall be appointed to represent
him; and
(c) the respondent's counsel represents the interests of the
respondent in an adversarial fashion, including but not limited to
cross-examination of state witnesses and production of expert and
non-expert witnesses on behalf of the respondent.
(3) If the court finds by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the
respondent is a substance dependent individual and as a result of the
substance dependence is dangerous to himself or others, it shall order
250. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359.
251. Compare N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.37 (McKinney 2006) (prohibiting involuntary
civil commitment on the basis of substance abuse without concurrent mental illness), with MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 35 (West 2003) (allowing involuntary civil commitment for substance
abuse for up to thirty days), and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-287 (1985) (allowing involuntary civil
commitment for substance abuse for up to 180 days).
252. See supraPart IV.A-B.
253. SAMHSA.gov, Agency Overview, http://www.samhsa.gov/About/background.aspx (last
visited Sept. 12, 2009).
254. See supranotes 33-35 and accompanying text (providing the APA definition of substance
dependence which should be used in the statute).
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for a period not in excess of ninety days commitment to and treatment
by an inpatient facility.
(a) "Dangerous to oneself' is defined as actions in the relevant
past which indicate a substantial risk of physical harm to oneself,
including threats or attempts of suicide or serious bodily harm or
other conduct demonstrating that the person is a danger to himself
(b) "Dangerous to others" is defined as actions in the relevant past
which indicate a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons,
including homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are
placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm.
Although enactment of legislation on civil commitment would
remain in the power of the states, the proposed rule would offer the
states a model that, if followed, would protect the liberty rights of the
individual while balancing the state's interest in compelling treatment.
Although some courts have found that the right to counsel attaches
in civil commitment proceedings 255 and state statutes reflect this
holding, 56 the mere presence of counsel does not adequately protect the
procedural or substantive due process rights of the individual facing
deprivation of liberty. An adversarial attorney acting as a zealous
advocate against civil commitment is imperative to lessen the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of liberty. 7 An attorney acting in the "best
interest" of the client is in effect another attorney for the state,
representing the state's interests, not the individual upon whose rights
the state is impinging. 258 Even though an adversarial approach is
consistent with the traditional client-lawyer relationship,259 the
adversarial role of the attorney must be specified in the statute because
the best interests approach has become common in involuntary civil
commitment hearings.26 °
A case-by-case analysis by the court of whether the state has
proved its burden imposed by the dangerousness standard will ensure
that the individual is not deprived of liberty unless commitment is the

255. In re Commitment of S.L., 462 A.2d 1252, 1259 (N.J. 1983); see also Ibur v. State, 765
So. 2d 275, 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
256. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 35 (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-286(d)
(2007).
257. See McCullough & Reinert, supra note 207, at 52.
258. See Winick, supra note 204, at 41-43 (discussing the ineffective representation of clients
in mental health courts).
259. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2007).
260. Winick, supranote 204 at 41-43.
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least restrictive alternative. 26' Additionally, the more narrowly tailored
definition of substance dependence will reduce the risk of erroneous
deprivation of liberty. 262 Civil commitment proceedings under the
proposed statute would best serve to protect the liberty interests of the
individual while addressing the need for compelled substance
dependence treatment in limited circumstances.
State adoption of the proposed statute would allow for earlier
intervention and treatment of drug dependent individuals, while ensuring
that they are not erroneously deprived of their liberty rights. Adoption of
such legislation is imperative in all states, including New York. The
prevalence of substance abuse and addiction is a serious problem in New
York, as it is nationwide.263 Although New York has successfully
implemented criminal diversion programs such as drug courts, these
programs target people who have already escalated to the point where
264
they are in the criminal justice system. 64 Current New York law leaves a
large gap in substance dependence treatment, in that it does not provide
a way to legally mandate treatment to substance dependent individuals
prior to their entry into the criminal justice system.2 65 This gap in
treatment has the potential to lead to tragic outcomes, as it did with
Natalie Ciappa. The rise of heroin use amongst teenagers and young
adults increases the dangerousness of the treatment gap.266 In order to
address this gap in treatment, New York, as well as all the other states,
should adopt the proposed statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although substance abuse is a pervasive, costly problem in
American society, many states do not have legislation permitting
compelled inpatient treatment within the civil system. Coerced treatment
is very common after entry into the criminal justice system and is
generally viewed as successful in reducing drug use and recidivism.
Compelling treatment only upon entry into the criminal justice system is
insufficient to meet societal needs, particularly in light of the
pervasiveness and cost of substance abuse and the correlation between
substance abuse and violent crime. Therefore, states should adopt the
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See supra text accompanying notes 243-244.
See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 22.09 (McKinney 2006).
See supra Part I.
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proposed statute permitting civil commitment for substance dependence
in order to provide necessary treatment without first requiring entry into
the criminal justice system.
Coerced treatment is generally viewed as an effective method of
treating substance dependence. Empirical research also supports the
efficacy of civil commitment in treating substance dependence. Although
coercion in the criminal context is more common in the United States,
legally mandated substance dependence treatment in the civil context
has historical roots and is accepted and practiced throughout the world.
Civil commitment would provide necessary and effective substance
dependence treatment to individuals regardless of entry into the criminal
justice system. The ability of a state to compel treatment is imperative,
especially in light of the rise of narcotic use across the nation.
Although the state has an interest both in providing treatment and
preventing illicit drug use, civil commitment imposes a very significant
restriction on liberty and therefore invokes the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to balance the state's interest with
the liberty interest of the individual, the proposed statute incorporates
stricter procedures and a more narrowly defined class of individuals
against whom the statute could be applied. Therefore, the proposed
statute should be adopted by New York and all other states in order to
provide necessary treatment to substance dependent individuals.
Rebecca L. Abensur*
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